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For philosophers, reading Richard Dawkins is often a frustrating experience. Many of Dawkins’ 
writings treat important philosophical topics, such as the existence of God, the meaning of life, 
the relationship of randomness to order. Dawkins has original ideas, but he lacks the 
philosophical training and vocabulary to articulate these ideas properly and to develop them 
coherently. In Believing in Dawkins, Eric Steinhart sets himself an ambitious task: to use the 
writings of Dawkins to present a coherent, naturalistic alternative to religious metaphysics, 
specifically to Christian theism. Using an architectural metaphor, he summarizes the project of 
Believing in Dawkins as follows  
It is helpful to think of the Dawkinsian texts in architectural terms. His 
fragmentary sketches for spiritual naturalism are like architectural drawings. 
Sometimes they depict little windows, while other times they portray enormous 
spires reaching towards the stars. The edifice is vast. But these architectural 
diagrams are often unclear, incomplete, and inconsistent. I want to clarify 
them, fill in their missing parts, and resolve their conflicts. So I’m using his 
writings to construct a novel building. … To fit his fragmentary plans into a 
coherent and self-supporting structure, I will add some large-scale frameworks 
(10). 
Steinhart’s wide-ranging book covers many topics: complexity, ontology, possibility, humanity, 
spirituality, among many others. He does not sneak theism into Dawkins’ writings. In fact, 
Steinhart argues that many practices and ideas that he uses to construct the edifice of Dawkins’ 
spiritual naturalism have been hijacked by theism, such as the notion of an afterlife, sacredness, 
holiness, and even the notion of gratitude.  
As Steinhart correctly and often points out, to be able to formulate a coherent 
metaphysical picture of naturalism that allows for atheist spirituality, one needs to 
go beyond Dawkins or, as he puts it, one has to build on Dawkins: “Given the Dawkinsian 
fragments and foundations, I prefer to think of myself as building a sanctuary. It is a sacred 
place, filled with joy and light. It is a spiritual refuge, a gleaming city” (10). Theists are welcome 
at this sanctuary for spiritual naturalism, as long as they leave their theism behind at the door. He 
likens himself to an architect trying to finish Gaudi’s Sagrada Familia, using sketchy directions 
of the original designer. 
Steinhart delivers on this vision of a gleaming city for spiritual atheists. He outlines a 
vision of spiritual naturalism that is based on key Dawkinsian ideas, such as the importance of 
replicators, the way complexity increases in a universe without designers, the role of an objective 
ethics, how to conceive of the good without God. To be able to build this gleaming city, though, 
Steinhart has to draw on some sophisticated ancient metaphysical assumptions. From Stoicism, 
he takes many ideas including the concept of arete or excellence. Dawkins shares with the Stoics 
the idea that nature is rational, undergirded with rational principles. Steinhart builds on Dawkins 
by updating the idea of the Logos, an ordering principle of nature, by adding some Dawkinsian 
ideas. These include universal selection, which not only creates biological, but also cultural 
entities. The second metaphysical framework Steinhart employs is (Neo)Platonism. Like the 
Platonists, Dawkins affirms that abstract mathematical structures exist, and he frequently talks 
about the space of possible organisms as real things. Thirdly, Steinhart harkens back to the 
Nietzschean notion of amor fati, the notion of loving your fate, for good or for ill. 
Throughout Steinhart’s discussions of Dawkinsian spiritual naturalism, we can find 
notions ordinarily associated (or at least associated currently) with theism, such as holiness, 
goodness, sacredness, and ecstasy updated and reframed in an atheistic context. For example, ek-
stasis means literally (in Greek) to “stand outside.” In Steinhart’s conceptualization, ecstasy 
occurs when part of the universe mirrors the whole. Self-modeling is the ecstasy of the universe, 
and so, when we model the universe, as creatures who perceive, and as scientists who try to 
model the universe, the universe is in ecstasy (54). This is an attractive spiritual vision. 
Steinhart also updates several theistic arguments in naturalistic context. There is a 
naturalized organic design argument, cosmological arguments, an ontological argument, and 
there is an atheistic equivalent to theodicy, a response to Yujin Nagasawa’s question of how an 
atheist can be optimistic or hopeful in the bleak world she inhabits. 
One of the most appealing and interesting ideas in the book is the formulation of an 
atheistic optimism. Optimism becomes possible if one abandons a utilitarian notion of equating 
the good with pleasure or even happiness. Steinhart draws on the Stoics, who were not 
utilitarians. They did not think you could equate happiness with good and misery with evil, 
though they personally preferred happiness to misery. Rather, the Stoics saw excellence (arete) 
as revealed most in struggle—a virtuous life is one characterized by striving for virtue in the face 
of struggle, and a virtuous life is a beautiful life. Updated in Dawkinsian terms, the Logos is the 
rational self-ordering of nature.Through universal Darwinian principles, the Logos maximizes 
the “dramatic intensity of biological competition” (97). In the struggle (agon) for existence, arete 
is maximized. 
Steinhart demonstrates that Stoicism and Platonism, paired with pagan rituals and 
spirituality (as discussed in the final chapter) offer a marvelous vision for the naturalist, a vision 
that affords beauty, meaning, objective morality, excellence, teleology. But it also reveals 
sharply how much extra work needs to be done to build on Dawkins. To give just one example, 
Dawkins mocks the ontological argument (as well as other theistic arguments) his book The God 
Delusion. But, as Steinhart writes “the correct atheistic response [to this argument] is analysis 
and counterargument, not mockery and ad hominem attacks” (p. 192). To counter the ontological 
argument, Steinhart invokes the Platonic One, and he notes that he is building on Dawkins and 
extending far beyond Dawkins’ original writings, “I do not say that Dawkins is a Platonist” (p. 
204). 
These remarks reveal both the main strength and what I take to be the main weakness of 
the book. The strength of this book is that it offers a serious, thoughtful, atheistic spiritual 
naturalism. But the book purports to build on Dawkins, and even to “believe in Dawkins” (e.g., 
“Believing in Dawkins means providing some independent evidence that abstract objects exist” 
[204]). But, as Steinhart frequently points out, Dawkins frequently contradicts himself, and he 
does not provide sufficient grounding for his claims. He uses mockery rather than argument to 
rebut theists. Steinhart realizes this. Moreover, in some places in the book, for instance where 
Steinhart talks about the Platonic good, he writes, “You may object that we are very far from 
Dawkins now” (p. 217). Indeed! 
In chapter 8 (“Humanity”), Steinhart works like a patient theologian who tries to 
assemble and make sense of disparate parts of scripture into a coherent whole. He tries to make 
sense of Dawkins’ disparate writings to present a coherent vision of humanity in line with 
spiritual naturalism. The introduction of free will compatibilism, ethical naturalism, and natural 
duties lead us far beyond Dawkins. I wonder why Dawkins is needed at all to unify this vision, 
which can stand on its own. To take an analogy, it is possible to write a political philosophy that 
is coherent with the deeds of Charlemagne, but such a project is probably not worthwhile. So, we 
need a sense of when it is worthwhile to try to cash out and philosophically develop the ideas by 
a non-philosopher. While we have many writings by Dawkins, and there is something evocative 
there to be sure, I am not entirely convinced that Steinhart would not have been better off 
outlining his own theory, perhaps supported by a wider range of naturalistic authors. 
Chapter 9 outlines, in a tentative manner, some ways in which a Dawkins-inspired 
spiritual naturalism can enrich religious practices too. Steinhart here goes far beyond Dawkins, 
who is a cultural Christian and enjoys Christian (Church of England) rituals. By contrast, 
Steinhart is not content with singing Christian hymns and so he offers serious alternatives for the 
non-theist to achieve mystical experience, including ecstasy in rave dances, communion and 
fellowship in Burning Man, and self-knowledge and equanimity with Stoic mental exercises. 
In spite of my reservations with using Dawkins as a starting point for the naturalistic 
edifice that Steinhart constructed, my overall assessment is that this is an excellent, thought-
provoking book. It is my hope that this book can contribute to a conversation in philosophy of 
religion that goes beyond rehearsing arguments about the rationality of theism. While such 
discussions are valuable, we can enrich philosophy of religion by looking at a wider range of 
religious metaphysical views, and I think Steinhart does an excellent job of outlining a coherent 
vision of spiritual naturalism. This is a vision that is emphatically not nihilistic or hopeless, that 
sees beauty in the struggle of natural selection, and meaning in the fact that we are organisms try 
to make sense of the universe we inhabit. There is a lot of material here for discussion on the 
metaphysics and ethics of spiritual naturalism.  
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